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1 Introduction: governance and the delivery of
public goods and services
‘Governance’ is a very plurivalent term, used at a
number of different levels and covering objects of
a variety of types.1 It is not universally recognised
in the social sciences. Many commentators have
criticised the notion of governance for being
‘polluted’ by its normative definitions (developed
in particular by the World Bank, a disciple of
‘good governance’ strongly tinted with neoliberal
ideology),2 and/or to mask a ‘depoliticisation’ of
public affairs to the benefit of a purely technocratic
vision, which is either illusory or misleading
(Abrahamsen 2002; Hermet et al. 2005). But
governance may be conceived in a radically
different way, without normative or ideological
judgements, as associating the managerial as
well as the political dimensions of public or
collective actions (Blundo and Le Meur 2009).
Taking the concept of governance in a purely
descriptive and analytical sense, we can define it
as any organised method of delivering public or
collective services and goods according to specific
logics and norms, and to specific forms of
authority. Any organised form of this delivery,
operating according to specific norms, and
implementing specific logics, can then be
considered to be a mode of governance.
Our definition focuses on a specific function of
collective action, authority or regulation which
for a long time was associated with the state, but
which today can be implemented by other types
of players and institutions. The delivery of public
or collective services and goods can be carried
out in a liberal or bureaucratic manner,
centralised or decentralised, clientelist or
despotic, formal or informal, and driven by the
market or by the state. It can be either efficient
or not, delivering high-quality goods or services
or not. It may involve any level of society and the
state. Furthermore, the players (or
organisations) which deliver public or collective
services and goods are more and more numerous,
particularly in Africa. The modes of governance
there have become very varied, which opens up
the scope of analysis even more: ‘There is no
longer any public service in Africa whose delivery
does not include the greater or lesser
involvement of the four following instances: the
state administrative services, the development
administration (NGOs and international
agencies), the “community-type” organizations
(from associations to the municipal council), and
private operators’ (Blundo and Le Meur 2009).
Our definition of governance enables us,
therefore, to complement traditional
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anthropological approaches to the state in Africa.
For the most part, these approaches have
ignored the role of the state as a deliverer or
co-deliverer or manager/co-manager of goods
and services.3 The notion of the ‘delivery state’
can also be applied to local arenas, where
institutions, powers and players, united by
‘multiplex’ ties (Gluckman 1955), confront each
other on a daily basis and in concrete
interactions around the delivery function.4 The
coexistence of many modes of local governance
seems to us to be a central characteristic of
Niger as well as many African countries. The
process of ‘piling up’ types of power in local arenas
(Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1998) has
become generalised: when a new form of political
authority is set up (either by the state or by
development agencies) it does not substitute for
the layers of institutionality already in place but
adds to them. This is what gives a village power
structure its polycephalous character. There are
layers of power and legitimacy dating from
different periods which all coexist in the same
sociopolitical space, displaying a complex
mixture of mutual recognition and blind
competition, of tolerance and masked rivalry.
The analysis we propose of eight ‘modes of local
governance’ is based first and foremost on a body
of empirical data collected by Laboratoire
d’Etudes et de Recherches sur les Dynamiques
Sociales et le Développement Locale (Lasdel)
researchers over a number of years as part of a
research programme on local powers and
decentralisation in Niger.5 This research has led
us to distinguish eight distinct modes of local
governance which we call, respectively: chiefly,
associational, municipal, project-based,
bureaucratic, sponsorship-based, religious and
merchant.
Although we have observed them in most detail
in Niger, these modes are not only present in
Niger. Most Francophone African countries
present similar characteristics (naturally with
some important differences: Senegal has
experienced decentralisation since 1973; the
system of administrative chiefs was never
‘abolished’ in Niger while it was in Mali and
Benin, etc.). It also appears to us that, in
Anglophone countries, despite obvious
differences (British indirect rule, for example,
and its systematic ethnic policies; or the
existence of strong indigenous economic
dynamics in Ghana or Nigeria), the general
framework set out here remains essentially valid,
and can therefore serve as a basis for discussion
with the aim of characterising these various
modes of local governance in broader terms.
Certain of these modes of local governance are
the direct successors to the colonial period, while
others arise from post-independence political
upheavals or from development policies driven
from the North. All, however, are the product of
original and composite forms of public or
collective action and of interactions with users.
All undergo continual adjustments.
2 The ‘chiefly’ mode of local governance
The administrative system of chiefs was a
fundamental institution of the colonial state
apparatus, found throughout Africa, and was the
main form of local power, in the service of
colonisation, for more than 60 years. It was
inspired by various pre-colonial institutions, from
which it was supposed to derive its legitimacy.
However, these ‘administrative chiefs’ (we call
them this to distinguish them from pre-colonial
chiefs) had only a little in common with the
varied and heterogeneous political structures of
the pre-colonial era, even if they took over their
symbolic attributes and if the holders of the
positions were often descended from pre-colonial
aristocracies. They were in all cases, agents of
the colonial state, their main function being to
provide an interface between the colonial despot
and the populace (Olivier de Sardan 1984;
Mamdani 1996).
After independence, the system of chiefs was
often attacked, or even abolished, by the new
regimes, in particular those which assumed a
socialist orientation. But it has never completely
disappeared from the political landscape. With
democratisation, it has even returned to the
forefront of the local scene, at least symbolically,
presenting itself as ‘traditional’ chieftaincy
(thereby obliterating its colonial roots), but
much transformed in its recruitment as well as
in its functions. Today many chiefs in Niger (at
least at district level, and even more at provincial
level) are former civil servants, whose earlier
careers often included high-level administrative
tasks.
There are many variables which influence the
roles performed by the innumerable forms of
chieftaincy found across the continent today.
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Sometimes the modern state delegates to
chieftancy certain powers of arbitration, justice
and financial regulation, while elsewhere chiefs’
functions are purely informal or belong mainly to
a certain political folklore. Nevertheless, the
chiefly mode of local governance in West Africa
today presents some shared characteristics,
including among others: patrimonialism;
predation and corruption; patronage; absence of
real accountability to the people (to which one
might add aristocratic ostentation; the confusion
of powers, internecine rivalry; and the defence of
an aristocratic and patriarchal ideology).6
The chief ’s personal resources and expenditure
and office resources and expenditure are
officially (not informally) confused: that was
common practice during the colonial period with
the official backing of the state, and it is still the
case today. The chief in the best cases only
receives from the state an ‘allowance’, and must
therefore finance his official responsibilities
from his own income. Yet, he has a ‘position to
maintain’ as well as services to provide and his
role requires a great deal of expenditure. Alms
and gifts, providing help, supporting emissaries,
travel and visits, welcoming visitors: he must
continually reallocate, give, distribute. The chief
very officially finances ‘out of his own pocket’
activities linked to his function, and there is
therefore complete confusion between office
expenditure and personal expenditure: that is
true ‘patrimonialism’.
In Francophone Africa, the canton chief had
always enjoyed a great deal of toleration from the
colonial authorities, allowing him to raise taxes
known as ‘customary’ and other ‘contributions’ or
‘traditional’ (often neo-traditional) tributes from
those he administered. But the scale of such
collection had significantly fallen by the eve of
independence. The taxes became to a great
extent symbolic, without necessarily being
negligible. Today, for chiefly governance, the
acquisition of revenue is a decisive matter. The
chief finds new resources in the growing
vernalisation and commodification of agricultural
land, by selling land himself, or by taking a
commission or under-the-table payments to
guarantee sales or to adjudicate in disputes.
On the other hand, the chiefs redistribute a large
part of these ‘informal’ resources to their
dependants, their court and some of their
subjects. They should be generous, and help
people in need of assistance. The chief maintains
a complete network of clients and practices
various forms of patronage. Richness in men, like
richness in assets (and the permanent conversion
of financial capital into social capital, and vice
versa), are sine qua non conditions for access to the
system of chiefs and the success of a ‘reign’.
What is more, the chief is responsible for a
‘household’, which provides his support
personnel. He needs guards, people to represent
him to higher authorities in the capital, financial
resources, tax collectors to collect market dues,
emissaries that he can despatch to villages,
counsellors to deliver justice, and a secretary for
administrative tasks and to keep the necessary
records, without speaking of the inevitable
hangers-on attached to his person and singing
his praises. He systematically chooses his
collaborators and auxiliaries among his relatives
and dependants. They are rewarded by him,
informally. They are only beholden to him.
The chiefs avoid any formal accountability to
those they administer. They are chiefs for life,
and they are therefore not subject to any control
by their ‘subjects’. In many countries, the major
threat to them is their dismissal by the central
authorities, if they displease them too much,
which doubtless explains why the chiefs have, in
the great majority of cases, favoured the
incumbent regime.
3 The ‘associational’ mode of local governance
Introduced by the development agencies from
the North to provide for the operation and
management of the infrastructures financed by
them, this mode of governance has been
significant over at least the last 20 years, and
sometimes much more (in the case of the
cooperatives, for example). Development
cooperation agencies and NGOs required the
setting up of an institutional architecture based
on the Western associational model as a
conditionality of their local intervention. As a
result, such structures are widely distributed in
all African countries, with the same core
elements almost everywhere regardless of
region, sector or donor: the setting-up of
community-based organisations (or cooperatives,
development associations, etc.), elections of
representatives, establishment of management
committees, the designation of an executive
board, written accounts and annual general
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meetings. The system is more or less pyramid-
shaped (village councils, district committees,
regional boards, etc.). Often, the Northern
development agencies require a certain quota of
women in the various offices and committees, in
the name of a policy of empowerment. This
institutional architecture is founded on a few
keywords which characterise the type of
governance which it aims to promote: public
interest, community participation, transparency,
accountability, partnership, promotion of women
and training for democracy.
This associational mode of local governance is
fundamentally an import, promoted and guided
over an extended period by the various kinds of
development institutions from the North
(international organisations, bilateral or
multilateral cooperation, development banks,
small and large NGOs), and steered from a
distance by them.7 Another characteristic of this
institutional architecture is its combination of
lavishness and ephemerality. The numerous
external interventions are not coordinated, so
each creates its own ‘committees’ as it sees fit
across the country. This means that every
important village has a good dozen associational
management structures, each independent of the
others. But the life of these structures depends
on the resources and the power granted by the
providers of the funds, giving them a
fundamentally transient nature. When a
development project comes to an end, and all
projects reach an end after a few years, the
associations which it has set up also disappear.
This picture, in which the bulk of the local
associational world delivering services depends
directly or indirectly on development aid, has one
major exception. In the sectors of plantation
economy or export cultivation (e.g. cotton, coffee,
cocoa), strong associations of producers have
existed for a long time (based on the surpluses
generated and intensive technical management).
In this case, the associations of producers,
although they have been implemented and
supported by development agencies, deliver
services on the basis of internal rents, which they
control, while other associations linked to the
development agencies are sub-contractors of an
external rent (the ‘development rent’), controlled
in the North. We might therefore see in this, a
specific sub-mode of governance, an important
variant of the associational mode.
The associational world, especially in its informal
dimensions, is of course much more diversified
than this account suggests (it includes, for
example, home-town associations, youth
associations or specific age groups, tontines
[savings and loan circles], funeral groups,
vigilantes, etc.). Some of them deliver services in
their own manner, without being helped by
development agencies. But we will not take those
into account in this article, focusing on the
model imported by the development agencies,
which more or less deliver everywhere the same
services in the same manner: wells, grain mills,
credit, seeds, market gardening, etc.
Over the years and successive projects and waves
of promoters, the imported model has been
‘appropriated’ by the target populations,
becoming an essential part of the local
institutional landscape. However, this
‘appropriation’ of associational governance has
not really followed the direction anticipated by
the development agencies, far from it. For there
are two types of appropriation, ‘ideal
appropriation’ (the kind dreamed of in project
documents) and ‘real appropriation’ (the kind
actually undertaken by the local people).
The first would entail the internalisation of the
imported model by the people involved. That is,
based on the scenario promoted by the
development operators, the associational model
slowly becomes part of village reality, the
transplant ‘takes’, the imported standards are
adopted, democratic ideology is quietly
incorporated into the local political culture, little
by little the model’s required management
procedures come to be routinely applied by local
players, and the system is reproduced
spontaneously following the departure of the
‘project’.
The second kind of ‘appropriation’, the one
which passes a reality check, is much more
complex. It involves a move away from formal
rules and the following of practical norms with
quite a different content, operating on lines
which have multiple relationships with the
assigned goals, and bring into play social
mechanisms which are largely opaque to
external actors. The way associational structures
operate is actually quite different from what
their Western designers planned and their local
promoters had in mind.
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Thus, elections are often replaced by
appointments based on consensus or remote
control by the chief. Annual general assemblies
and committee meetings do not take place on
the expected dates, far from it. Accounts are not
provided, and management remains opaque.
Funds which are accumulated in the community
coffers are ‘borrowed’ (owing to an ‘over-
monetarisation’ of daily life, i.e. huge pressure
for cash) (Olivier de Sardan 1999; 2008a).8
Accusations of hijacking are omnipresent, but
the presumed authors are not punished. When
‘projects’ impose a rule of voluntary work for
positions on associational boards or management
committees, chairmen or treasurers bitterly
complain about this state of affairs and demand
a salary. Factional-type village rivalries erupt
incessantly into the daily life of the associations,
which are often seen more as a device in the
service of a particular group than as a common
asset serving everyone.
Even if this appropriation of the model seems to
be largely opportunistic, driven by the desire to
capture a share of the ‘development rent’, it is no
less real for that. It exemplifies a capacity for
innovation and adaptation to the modern
development context, and it has sociological
consequences: the ‘local brokers of development’
(Bierschenk et al. 2000) become a factor in local
arenas, and take their place alongside the project
promoters as a new type of social mediator.
4 The ‘municipal’ mode of local governance
Long present in Senegal (1973) and introduced
somewhat later in Côte d’Ivoire, the municipal
mode of local governance has truly been
implanted in several Francophone countries of
Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger)
only recently, as a result of decentralisation
policies. Although largely driven by external
partners, its motivations have sometimes
intersected with internal political considerations
(e.g. peace agreements with Tuareg rebels in
Mali and in Niger).
The modalities of these decentralisation reforms
vary quite significantly between countries, but
the result is almost the same everywhere: the
setting up across the whole national territory of
elected municipal councils (communes), with a
mayor chosen from among the councillors, which
administer territorial districts with budgetary
autonomy and take on various responsibilities
once handled by the central state. In rural areas
of Francophone countries,9 it has been a
fundamental innovation, introducing unfamiliar
ways of organising the delivery of public goods
and services, opening up a local space of
positions of power and establishing, through
commune elections, a new form of accountability
to all citizens. The experience in Niger, although
recent, provides various lessons in terms of the
operation of the municipal mode of governance,
which may have some validity elsewhere.
Whether because of shifting alliances (most often
unrelated to national alliances) between the
parties seeking a majority, or because of factional
struggles within the locally dominant party, it is
very rare for a mayor to be chosen by consensus.
Once elected, mayors are subject to strong and
permanent internal contestation, which has
resulted in many attempts to depose them.
Decentralisation has been a bonanza for political
parties. It has enabled them on the one hand to
establish themselves in a sustainable manner in
the interior of the country (where previously they
had only played a very sporadic role, and only
during national elections). On the other hand, it
has offered them ‘fresh’ positions to fill and an
opening up of the political field – in other words,
new categories of prominent people and new
forms of political recompense. In many
countries, indeed, the purpose of the
decentralisation reforms was to expand the
ruling party’s presence at the local level and
recruit new cadres, as in Côte d’Ivoire after 1985
(Crook and Manor 1998: 140).
Conversely, the national party structures are
more often than not ‘manipulated’ by the local
notables (in much the same way that
‘development projects’ are). They are ‘using the
parties’ to promote their personal interests, or
strengthen their own client networks, or simply
to enjoy an income or pecuniary advantage.
Frequently, the observed patterns of partisan
loyalty, shifting alliances and political nomadism
seem to stem from purely local conflicts and
from long-standing factional rivalries.
Local elections are perceived as an opportunity
for the voters to ‘eat’, in other words as a rent
from which the maximum benefit must be
obtained. What is sometimes termed ‘electoral
corruption’ has thus become a central element of
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the political landscape, and decentralisation has
clearly accentuated and ‘democratised’ this
phenomenon. ‘Privilegism’ (the quest for
privileges) and informal privatisation have also
been ‘decentralised’; maximisation of the
benefits associated with a given function seems
to be commonplace. If evidence of proven
embezzlement is hard to find, suspicion and
accusations are always there.
5 The ‘project-based’ mode of local governance
The term ‘project’ has been added to the local
languages to mean all forms of development aid
and structures present on a local scale, regardless
of the promoter (national or international).
While the project-based mode engenders, feeds
and finances the associational mode described
above, it also has its own independence and exists
in the field in the form of an enclave or as a
management, training or monitoring body.
In one sense, the project-based mode of local
governance is part of the same political and
management space as the bureaucratic mode of
local governance and it fulfils some of its
functions, either in its place, in competition with
it or in addition to it. But unlike the latter,
characterised by extreme poverty, it represents
on the contrary an oasis of prosperity which is
the envy of all public servants, whose ambition is
to be hired by a project, or failing that, to be
financed by it.
The project-based mode is based on
sophisticated logistical infrastructures which are
completely out of keeping with the social and
administrative context. It represents a form of
mutualisation of spectacular bureaucratic
privileges, financed by a Northern agency in
accordance with extra-territorial accounting and
administrative procedures, all in the service of a
developmental mission. A development project is
both a financing agency supporting various local
actors (in particular the local associations it has
itself created), and a fulfilment agency, providing
certain goods and services either directly or
indirectly.
The managers, once essentially expatriates, are
more and more frequently nationals, generally
obtained from the best elements of the civil
service (according to an internal ‘brain drain’
which has become systematic). The projects also
call upon cohorts of salaried agents, recruited
locally and present throughout the country, who
act as the interface with local populations.
They are by definition, provisional structures,
intended to enable the goods and services which
they provide to become progressively delivered
by local players. But when a project disappears, it
normally results in the disappearance of the
goods and services which it provided.
6 The ‘bureaucratic’ mode of local governance
Under the colonial regime, which created the
modern state in Africa (in a markedly derogated
form, particularly under the indigénat [native
code] regime), the presence of the state at a
local level was symbolised by the presence of the
commandant de cercle (colonial official heading a
native administration) and the individuals in his
service. So, the bureaucratic mode of governance
was essentially ab initio of a despotic kind.
Security (both political and military) and fiscal
and human levies (forced labour, conscription)
were priority tasks, with a large margin for
manoeuvre, leaving room in particular for many
privileges, such as the ability to call upon
intermediaries. The administrators, prefects and
sub-prefects took up the baton at independence,
often reproducing the same form of despotic
governance. At the same time, independence saw
the progressive installation in the interior of the
country (at the level of small rural towns) of
state’s technical services: health, education,
agriculture, animal husbandry, water, etc. The
bureaucratic mode of local governance
encompasses what we have elsewhere called the
‘local state’, namely the segments of the state
present in the interior of the country.
With decentralisation and democratisation, a
major change to the bureaucratic mode of local
governance has taken place over recent years.
On the one hand, the significantly named
‘command’ system of administration has had to
break with the key characteristics of old-
fashioned despotism, and to change, at least
officially, into a body supporting the communes
and controlling them. But, on the other hand,
the current phase is marked by a great deal of
friction between the mayors and the prefects or
governors. The latter are keen to retain some of
their prerogatives, and aim to ensure the pre-
eminence of the local state’s political
administration over the mayors. For their part,
the decentralised technical services, now
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stripped of much of their previous role, are
attempting to reconvert themselves and become
the technical support arm of the communes, with
the support of foreign partners.
7 The ‘sponsorship-based’ mode of local
governance
The role of sponsorship patronage has been largely
underestimated and under-studied in Africa. Yet,
as Bierschenk (2006: 551) clearly shows – writing
about Parakou in Benin although it is also true of
Niger and many other countries – the logic of
sponsorship is at the heart of local (and national)
political life. We could say the same for certain
public or collective services which are regularly
delivered in this way. The main manifestations are
the construction or repair of infrastructure
(religious infrastructure, village water supplies and
health centres or school buildings); the paying in
the name of the populations of taxes to the state or
the commune or of the quotas required by projects;
and food aid in the event of shortages.
The social players likely to play the role of
sponsors are varied. Alongside the model of the
rich trader established in the town, or in a
neighbouring country (often an illiterate El
Hadj), other models exist, such as that of the
politician or senior civil servant who hails from
the area. Temporary or permanent migrants can
also undertake sponsorship initiatives. But while
this sort of patron has a foothold in the village or
district of origin, he generally lives elsewhere,
and his sponsorship activities are a means of
achieving a high profile in the local arena (either
to play a role himself, or to enable ‘placement’ of
his dependants or clients).
8 The ‘religious’ mode of local governance
The delivery of public or collective services and
goods by religious bodies sometimes seems close
to the sponsorship-based mode, and sometimes to
the associational mode, but there are sufficient
specific features to justify speaking of a religious
mode of local governance. The relevant
organisations include not only those of the major
religions (Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam), but
also different currents within the major religions
(charismatic movements, Islamic brotherhoods)
or those on their periphery (syncretic and
prophetic churches, sects). Some forms of social
action and services (education, health,
humanitarian interventions) are particularly
associated with this mode of governance, focusing
on collective, societal extension of the charity
demanded of the faithful. An ability to mobilise
international networks is a feature of the
religious mode of local governance. The role of
charismatic leaders, supported by religious
legitimacy, must also be emphasised.
9 The ‘merchant’ mode of local governance
The privatisation of certain areas of service-
provision in favour of multinational businesses has
been a strong theme in recent times as a result of
international neoliberal policies. At the same time,
there is increasing recourse, at local level, to
private providers to deliver public or collective
services and goods, often responding to other types
of logic. Like the sponsorship-based and religious
modes of local governance, the merchant mode is
an aggregate of various practices by a
heterogeneous set of players. However, these
players share the feature that they have emerged
from and been shaped by the everyday world of
commercial exchange. Hence, the collective goods
and services that they provide are paid-for services,
resulting in income-generation and profit.
We might be tempted to suppose that, since it
involves a commercial transaction, privatised
provision is in contradiction to an approach in
terms of public goods and services. Nothing is
less certain. Just as sponsor-patrons and the
associational sector play a public action role, so
do some private operators. Decentralisation and
pressure from donors have opened up a whole
range of ways of delivering public or collective
goods and services which are commercial but
nevertheless under the communes’ or the state’s
responsibility. They include public service
outsourcing, concessions and state-controlled
subcontracting.
The merchant mode of local governance must
not be confused, in this respect, with the
privatisations of public agencies in the large
towns, which under the pressure of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
structural adjustment programmes opened up
the water, electricity or telephone markets to
large international groups (Jaglin 2005).
10 Conclusion: local political culture
These eight modes coexist, in general, in the
same political space and in the same local
arenas. Yet they are not all present everywhere,
and not present with the same intensity or the
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same density across administrative levels or
regions. Each mode delivers a more or less wide
range of goods and services, and can be more or
less specialised, while many goods or services are
delivered, in a manner which can be
complementary or competitive, by various
modes. But the most frequent configuration is
the co-delivery of a good or service by actors
belonging to a number of different modes
(Olivier de Sardan, Niger, this IDS Bulletin).
The modes, as discussed here, are ‘ideal-types’.
This has two consequences. Firstly, in concrete
terms, they occasionally or even regularly overlap
and roles may change: a chief, a mayor, a prophet
or a prefect can also undertake sponsorships.
Secondly, each mode is also cut across by internal
differences: a village chief can be a simple
peasant without resources or followers, which is
never the case for district chiefs.
We should consider also the nature of the norms
which officially or publicly regulate action within
modes of governance (official norms and social
norms) and the discrepancies between these and
the corresponding practical norms. Each mode
has its own official set of official norms.
Bureaucratic, municipal, project-based and
associational modes are ringed by a vast network
of formal, written norms and procedures, while
the sponsorship-based, merchant, chiefly and
religious modes derive above all from social
norms (even if various legal texts more or less
define their activities). Each mode also has its
own set of practical norms (patterns of informal
shared practices which move around, or outside
of, official norms). From one mode of local
governance to the next, the discrepancy between
the official norms and the practical norms can
vary considerably (Olivier de Sardan 2008b).
But can we not, behind the diversity of modes of
local governance, identify some common cross-
cutting characteristics, at least for the arenas of
action observed in Niger? Indeed, various types of
political behaviour can be found in several modes
of local governance, sometimes even in all of
them. ‘Informal privatisation’ (paying a fee for the
delivery of a service which is normally free), which
may be considered to be a form of corruption
(Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2007), is an
inseparable feature of the bureaucratic mode of
local governance. But it is also observed in the
municipal mode, the associational mode and even
in the project-based mode. Patron–client relations
are present everywhere, regardless of mode. The
management style of the chiefs has become a
point of reference for all political leadership.
These practices and representations shared by
actors belonging to different modes of local
governance could be conceptualised in terms of
local political culture. Precise, circumscribed,
empirically-based uses of the concept of ‘culture’
are possible without falling into the ‘culturalist-
traditionalist’ trap, with its host of clichés,
amalgams and presuppositions. Local political
culture is not the political culture of the elites in
the capital, neither is it the expression of ‘pre-
colonial tradition’, and it obviously has nothing
to do with any distinctive ‘African culture’.10
Local political culture is a set of shared modern
practices and representations relating to the practical
operation of modes of local governance in specific local
arenas. A comparative characterisation of local
political cultures can therefore be envisaged, at
least for Niger, in spite of the dangers of false
homogenisation and generalisation.
Factionalism, clientelism, impunity, coping
strategies and resourcefulness, the combination
of apparent consensus and strong local conflicts,
generalised suspicion, priority given to network
affiliations, absence of transparency, hegemony
of the merchants, opportunistic strategies in
order to obtain development aid, political
transhumance, vote-buying and electoral
cheating, ‘privilegism’, ostentatious generosity,
selective mutual support, Islamic legitimisations,
informal privatisation, the reduction of women
selected for official functions to window-dressing
roles – all of these characteristics can be found,
in varying but significant degrees, in local arenas
in Niger. Yet neither can we exclude from this
local political culture expectations of justice or
equity, which are expressed for example in the
strong criticisms of the behaviour of urban elites,
politicians and district chiefs which feature
regularly in our interviews. In other words, the
unsatisfied expectations of the people about the
delivery of public goods and services, and
challenges to established local powers, are in our
opinion part of the political culture as much as
the practices generated by the modes of local
governance. Neither must we neglect the forms
of solidarity, the various efforts by militants, or
the episodes of collective mobilisation which
occur in various places.
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Local political culture, as emerging from
empirical inquiries, is on the one hand a more or
less shared ideological construct, latent,
changing and ambivalent, crossing the different
modes of local governance and interacting with
them. On the other hand, it is made up of all the
shared practical norms concerning collective
action, power and the delivery of goods and
services, regardless of whether these norms are
more or less close to official norms. It is what
actors of different modes of governance have in
common when performing their respective roles.
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Notes
1 A great deal has been written about this term,
see Gaudin (2002); Baron (2003).
2 This defining text associates ‘good
governance’ closely with the creation of an
environment favourable to international
businesses (World Bank 1992).
3 We note, however, the invitations from
Darbon (1985, 2001) or Copans (2001) to turn
in this direction.
4 On the notion of local arena, see Bierschenk
and Olivier de Sardan (1997, 1998); Dartigues
(1997) and more generally, Swartz (1968) and
Bailey (1969).
5 See the many reports edited in Etudes et Travaux
du Lasdel (www.lasdel.net/etude.php).
6 For more detailed analysis of the ‘chiefly’ or
‘chieftancy’ mode and of the ‘associational
mode’, see Olivier de Sardan (2009).
7 Apart from the ‘participationist’ paradigm of
the end of the 1980s, which widely extended
the scope of the associational mode, we must
remember the existence, from independence
and sometimes earlier (Chauveau 1994), of
cooperative or community-based organisations
which were also set up from the outside.
8 It was Raynaut (1977) who first drew
attention to the importance of monetary
circulation in the Maradi region of Niger.
9 Many of the major towns have been communes
since the 1960s, but these were governed by
appointed non-elected mayors (delegates of
the central authority) until the
democratisation reforms of the 1980s/90s.
10 Elsewhere, we have emphasised the central
role of the colonial heritage in the modern
configuration of African states (Olivier de
Sardan 2004). For a critical description of
‘traditionalist Africanist culturalism’, see
Olivier de Sardan (2010). Bierschenk does not
use the term ‘political culture’ about elections
in Benin, but instead employs the similar
notion of ‘political style’ (2006: 567). For an
analysis of political culture in Niger, see
Hahonou (2010).
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